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Abstract
Probabilistic reasoning biases have been widely associated with levels of delusional belief ideation (Galbraith, Manktelow, & Morris, 2010;
Lincoln, Ziegler, Mehl, & Rief, 2010; Speechley, Whitman, & Woodward, 2010; White & Mansell, 2009), however, little research has focused
on biases occurring during every day reasoning (Galbraith, Manktelow, & Morris, 2011), and moral and crime based reasoning (Wilkinson,
Caulfield, & Jones, 2014; Wilkinson, Jones, & Caulfield, 2011). 235 participants were recruited across four experiments exploring crime
based reasoning through different modalities and dual processing tasks. Study one explored delusional ideation when completing a visually
presented crime based reasoning task. Study two explored the same task in an auditory presentation. Study three utilised a dual task
paradigm to explore modality and executive functioning. Study four extended this paradigm to the auditory modality. The results indicated
that modality and delusional ideation have a significant effect on individuals reasoning about violent and non-violent crime (p < .05), which
could have implication for the presentation of evidence in applied setting such as the courtroom.
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Individuals engage in reasoning processes as they interact and exist within the world (Green & Gilhooly, 2005).
Whilst people have the ability to successfully navigate their way through everyday complex situations, ‘biases’
or errors in reasoning have been detected whilst individuals solve simple reasoning problems in a psychological
laboratory setting (Verschueren, Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle, 2005). This setting potentially differs to everyday life
in that the environment is controlled and usually the individual is focussing on a single task, as opposed to
everyday life where individuals are processing multiple streams of rich sensory information (Wilkinson,
Caulfield, & Jones, 2014; Wilkinson, Jones, & Caulfield, 2011).
Delusional Ideation in Clinical Populations
It is argued that reasoning impairments contribute to the formation and maintenance of delusional beliefs
(Coltheart, Langdon, & McKay, 2011; Connors & Halligan, 2015). An influential study being Huq, Garety, and
Hemsley (1988) of the beads task paradigm. ‘Probabilistic style’ reasoning (Oaksford & Chater, 2001), plays a
central role in the conditional inference process (Oaksford, Chater, & Larkin, 2000), and can lead to errors in
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individuals reasoning (Evans, Ellis, & Newstead, 1996; George, 1997; Stevenson & Over, 1995). Probabilistic
reasoning bias’ have been widely reported in clinical populations with a diagnosis of a psychosis (Garety,
Hemsley, & Wessely, 1991; Hemsley & Garety, 1986; Huq, Garety, & Hemsley, 1988) which suggests that
under conditions of uncertainty, patients with delusions demonstrate a `jumping to conclusions' (JTC) style of
reasoning, requiring less information to come to a decision, and being more confident about the decision that
they have reached (e.g. Dudley, John, Young, & Over, 1997; Fear & Healy, 1997; Garety et al., 1991; Huq et al.,
1988). However, recent studies, such as Ross et al. (2016), proposes that it is analytic cognitive style – defined
as the willingness or disposition to critically evaluate outputs from intuitive processing and engage in effortful
analytic processing – that predicts data gathering on a bead task rather than delusional ideation.
Delusional Ideation in Healthy Populations
The continuity approach has gathered a wealth of support with regards to considering delusions and other
features of psychosis being measurable on a continuum that extends from and includes clinical and nonclinical
population (Freeman, Pugh, Vorontsova, Antley, & Slater, 2010; Galbraith, Morgan, Jones, Ormerod, Galbraith,
& Manktelow, 2014; van Os, Linscott, Myin-Germeys, Delespaul, & Krabbendam, 2009). Schizotypy is a sub-
clinical category of experience which captures individuals who present schizo-psychopathological
characteristics but are not extreme enough to be classified as requiring clinical attention of diagnostic (Claridge
& Beech, 1995). Gruzelier (1996) suggests that schizotypy consists mainly of impulsive non-conformity, social
anxiety, positive features such as unusual perceptions, and negative features such as introversion.
Researchers, such as Galbraith, Manktelow, and Morris (2008, 2010), have conducted a number of studies
exploring psychopathological tendency primarily composed of samples of non-pathological individuals.
Galbraith et al.’s approach, using a psychometric test to screen for schizotypal tendencies, circumvent issues of
medication effects, motivation and the nature and severity of the symptoms and experiences over time faced
when testing a clinical sample (Galbraith, Manktelow, & Morris, 2010; Thurston et al., 2008). Furthermore,
moral and ethical responsibilities of testing clinical patients are overcome (Galbraith, Manktelow, & Morris,
2010).
Crime Based Reasoning
Decision making in the real world includes reasoning about crime based scenarios (Wilkinson, Caulfield, &
Jones, 2014; Wilkinson, Jones, & Caulfield, 2011). A wealth of research has argued that decision making
processes in forensic and legal setting are subject to errors and biases (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2014; Gunn et
al., 2016; Sonnemans & van Dijk, 2012). Sonnemans and van Dijk (2012) reviewed the types of errors
investigated and documented including judicial decision errors and biases. Scientific investigations and
methods of research do not easily lend themselves to exploring the judicial system and therefore other modes
and methods of representative environments, such as mock scenarios and mock court rooms, have been
utilised (Carter & Mazzula, 2013; Kapardis & Farrington, 2015; Krauss & Lieberman, 2016).
Probabilistic style decision making is applied by a jury to criminal cases during court proceedings, with the
outcome being to assess the likelihood of a guilty or not guilty verdict based on the evidence provided
(Sonnemans & van Dijk, 2012). However, probabilities are not always assessed, in this context, quantitatively
and different legal systems present information in differing styles, amounts and timings (Sonnemans & van Dijk,
2012). The rate of decision making, including the amount of information gathered before making a decision
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could have profound affects in practice, for example, jury decision making (Nicholson, Yarbrough, & Penrod,
2014). Previous research has considered the relationship between schizotypy and crime based reasoning using
qualitative methods (Wilkinson, Caulfield, & Jones, 2014; Wilkinson, Jones, & Caulfield, 2011) and found clear
qualitative self-reported differences in probabilistic reasoning styles from their participants.
This study aimed to assess the relationship between delusional beliefs and probabilistic style reasoning of
crime based scenarios using a series of experiments that manipulated the presentation of evidence through
auditory and visual modalities whilst also introducing a distraction utilising a dual taking paradigm, mimicking
the type of processing that may happen in an applied setting such as a courtroom. It was hypothesised that
individuals with high scores for delusional beliefs, compared to low scorers, would require fewer pieces of
information before making a decision. It was also hypothesised that the distraction task would increase the
difference observed between high and low scorers in terms of information gathering.
Experiment One
Method
Participants
Through convenience sampling, forty-five (11 male and 34 female) student volunteers from various
undergraduate courses at a west-midlands UK based university took part in this study. The age of the
participants ranged between 19 and 44 (M = 24.33, SD = 6.82). No other demographic information was
collected.
Design
This study adopted a mixed (one within and one between factor) 2x2 experimental design. The study consisted
of a within participant factor, violent (emotionally arousing) and non-violent scenarios, and a between
participant factor, high and low scorers on the Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI). The dependent variable was
data gathering (which was a measure based on a scale to rate how much information an individual required
before making a decision).
Materials and Procedure
The following measures were presented to participants. The Peters Delusions Inventory (Peters et al., 1999) –
paper form- is a 21-item measure of delusional ideation. The scale has good levels of reliability and validity
(Peters et al., 2004). The response format is a 5 point scale for distress, preoccupation, and conviction in
relation to the 21-items presented. The Computerised Visual Reasoning Task (CVRT) was specially designed
to measure individuals crime based decision-making about whether the character in two scenarios ‘had done
the right thing’. Participants were able to gather as much or as little information as they desired about a given
scenario before making a decision. This concept derived from traditional reasoning tasks, such as the beads
tasks, except applied to a manufactured but realistic life scenarios.
The violent scenario (emotionally arousing) used a story about a character that attacked a ‘youth’ in the street
(see Appendix 1). The attack was based on a number of assumptions. Following the short story about the
sequence of events leading to the attack were subsequent statements that provided additional information and
described a more complete picture of the events. Each additional statement was displayed on screen for as
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long as the participant wished to view. The non-violent scenario was based on a story about a character that
lied in order to borrow money from a man with no intention to pay him back. The statements following the short
story described vital information with regards to exposing the truth behind the character’s need for the money.
Participants were required to indicate at which point they were happy to make a decision by pressing the D key
and the number of required statements recorded.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
The reasoning task results were analysed using SPSS statistics 17.0 and are presented below. Descriptive
statistics for the ‘data gathering’ scores can be viewed in Table 1. The descriptive statistics suggested that high
PDI scorers require less information compared to low PDI scorers for both violent and non violent crime
scenarios, although this effect is represented to a greater extent in the non violent crime scenario.
Table 1
Data Gathering Descriptive Statistics
Crime Type
Low PDI (n = 15) High PDI (n = 15)
df F pM SD M SD
Violent 1,43 0.16 .69
2.57 2.53 2.14 2.25
Non violent 1,43 6.96 .04
3.71 2.34 1.79 1.42
Inferential Statistics. A two-way mixed ANOVA suggested that there was not a significant interaction between
PDI and Crime Type, F(1, 41) = 3.15, p = .08. Further analysis showed a low effect size (d = 0.18) according to
Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1992).
Non-Violent Scenario and ‘Data Gathering’
Whilst a non-significant interaction was found overall, a significant effect was highlighted when analysing PDI
on ‘data gathering’ with regards to reasoning about non-violent scenarios, F(1, 41) = 6.96, p = .01. Further
analysis revealed a large effect size (d = 1.02) according to Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1992).
Discussion
The data collected from the reasoning task suggest that there were no significant differences between high and
low PDI scorers, when measuring the amount of information required before making a decision about a violent
crime scenario. However, there was a significant difference when reasoning about a non-violent scenario.
Despite the non significant results from the violent scenario, it is still possible to see a trend in the mean ‘data
gathering’ scores that suggests that high scorers requested less information when reasoning about a violent
crime. It seems that low scoring individuals required more information, when compared to high scoring
individuals, before making a decision or coming to a conclusion. The implications of this could be detrimental in
setting such as the court room where in an adversarial process a jury is making a decision based on
information that is staggered in presentation.
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Experiment Two
Little research has explored the impact that modality (auditory vs. visual) may have on reasoning biases,
particularly when considering delusion ideation and especially given the characteristics, such as deficits in
auditory sensory “echoic” memory (Umbricht et al., 2000) associated with ‘schizotype’ experiences. These
deficits lead to difficulties in extracting relevant information from sensory stimuli across all modalities (Javitt et
al., 2000).
As such, individuals who experience deficits in extracting relevant information may produce biases on tasks
that require the utilisation of represented extracted information. In other words, some individuals are
overwhelmed with the mass of information available through their senses, and are unable to filter out the
relevant or important information (Delhommeau, Dubal, Collet, & Jouvent, 2003). This study, therefore, adapted
the materials from experiment one to present in an auditory format to consider the affect that modality has on
crime based reasoning when considering delusional ideation. It was hypothesised that the auditory version of
the experiment would capture greater differentiation between high and low scorers on delusional ideation in
terms of the amount of information required before they made a decision.
Method
Participants
Fifty-five university students participated in this study. All participants were undergraduate students from a
range of faculties and degree courses across the University. Participants were aged between 19 and 52 (M =
23.8, SD = 8.01), ten were males and forty-five females.
Design
A 2x2 experimental design was adopted for this study. Similar to study one, independent variable one was
based on PDI scores and independent variables two was based on scenario type (violence and non-violent).
Materials and Procedure
Consistent with study one, the 21-item Peters Delusions Inventory (Peters et al., 1999) was used to measure
delusional ideation (see study one for more information). The Computerised Auditory Reasoning Task (CART)
was specially designed for this study, which was an adaptation from study one. The auditory reasoning task
presented the same information as study one but through an auditory modality, given the evidence of cross
modality bias occurring in individuals with schizotypy as well as a small amount of evidence for differentiation in
psychosis prone individuals (Ferstl, Hanewinkel, & Krag, 1994; Reed et al., 2008). Once again, Eprime
programming software was used to program, present and capture participant’s responses. Participants wore a
head set in order to listen to the crime based scenarios and additional information. Given that the information
was delivered to participants through auditory presentation, statements could be heard once unlike study one
where participants could read and re-read on screen.
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Results
Descriptive statistics. The reasoning task results were analysed using SPSS statistical analysis software 17.0,
and are presented below. Descriptive statistics for the ‘data gathering’ scores can be viewed in Table 2.
Table 2
Data Gathering Descriptive Statistics
Crime Type
Low PDI (n = 19) High PDI (n = 19)
df F pM SD M SD
Violent 1,53 23.18 .02
6.78 3.95 2.22 3.04
Non violent 1,53 8.82 .01
6.06 2.65 3.11 3.27
Inferential Statistics
The results from the Levene’s pre-test were non significant and therefore did not violate any assumptions for
parametric testing (Levene’s p > 0.05). A two-way mixed Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was performed on the
results of the reasoning task, therefore considering the independent variables of PDI (high and low) and crime
type (violent and non-violent), and the dependent variable data gathering. The two-way mixed ANOVA revealed
a non-significant interaction between PDI and scenario type, F(2, 32) = 15.04, p < .001. Further analysis
showed a large effect size according to Cohen’s d (d = 1.3), and retrospective power = 0.99 (Cohen, 1992).
Discussion
The results from this study demonstrated, through a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), that overall there
was no interaction between PDI and crime type, however, the p and F values suggested significant differences
between high and low scorers within each crime type (violent and non violent). Either individuals who scored
high for Schizotypal tendencies required fewer ‘chunks’ of information before making a decision (data
gathering), compared to individuals who scored low for Schizotypal tendencies, or it is possible that low scorers
gathered more information in comparison to high scorers. The descriptive statistics suggest that the violent
crime scenario, which was potentially more emotionally arousing, created a bigger gap between the mean ‘data
gathering’ scores generated by the high and low scoring groups. Therefore, it could be argued that the violent
crime scenario enhanced the ‘jump to conclusions’ bias that frequently occurs in individuals at risk of delusions
(Huq, Garety, & Hemsley, 1988) or with high levels of delusional ideation (Galbraith, Manktelow, & Morris,
2010), or caused low scorers to gather further information before making a decision. Furthermore, the results
suggest that the biases in reasoning that accompany delusional beliefs, which have presented themselves on
traditional non-specific reasoning tasks, also present themselves when making decisions about crime based
situations which could have implications in legal settings when undergoing probabilistic decisions based on
case evidence (Sonnemans & van Dijk, 2012).
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Experiment Three
Dual Processing Theory
Dual process theories have provided an alternative explanation to previous single system theories which
propose that cognitive processes such as reasoning are governed by a single system (Braine, 1990; Johnson-
Laird, 1983; Rips, 1994). Dual process theories, therefore, arguably stand in contrast to modular models of
human cognition (Barrett & Kurzban, 2006; Carruthers, 2006; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Sperber, 1994). Dual
processing accounts of reasoning and human behaviour have been developed by both cognitive and social
psychologists (Manktelow, 2012), the relevance of which is the theoretical application to ‘higher’ cognitive
processes which include thinking, reasoning, decision making, and social judgment (Evans, 2008). All dual
process theories share the common idea that there are two differing modes of processing: System One and
System Two (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Stanovich, 1999). The first system, occasionally referred to as the
heuristic system (De Neys, 2006), solves problems based on an individual’s prior knowledge and beliefs. The
second system, sometimes referred to as the analytic system, allows reasoning according to logical standards,
which requires access to a central working memory system of limited capacity. As a result, System One is
assumed to operate rapidly and automatically, whereas the operations of the analytic system are believed to be
slow and heavily demanding of resources (De Neys, 2006). These two systems can act in concert and
consequently the heuristic system will usually provide a fast, frugal and correct conclusion. However, heuristic
processing can lead to biased reasoning in situations that require more elaborate and analytic processing. This
occurrence leads to conflict between the two systems (Stanovich & West, 2000).
Study three explored whether the results of study two were indicative of modality, visual vs. auditory, or whether
auditory processing requires a dual process system. It was hypothesised that an additional active task would
increase the differentiation of reasoning scores for high and low scorers.
Method
Participants
74 participants from a west midlands University took part in this study. The participants were undergraduate
students from a range of Faculties and degree courses across the University. Participants were aged between
18 and 54 (M = 22.5, SD = 6.69), 23 were males and 51 females. It was ensured during the recruitment stage
that all participants were first language native English speakers.
Design
The 2x2x2 experiment designed enabled the exploration of three independent variables: PDI (between factor
determined by the scores on the Peters Delusions Inventory: Peters & Garety, 1996); scenario type (within
factor representing non-violent and violent); and memory task (within factor compiled of high and low memory
load) explored using a dot matrix memory task. There was one dependent variable which was the amount of
information required before making a decision based on a 0-8 scale (data gathering).
Materials and Procedure
Consistent with previous studies presented in this paper the 21-item Peters Delusions Inventory (Peters et al.,
1999) was used to measure delusional belief ideation (see previous studies for more information). The Dual
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Processing Visual Computerised Decision Task (DPVCDT) was specially developed for this study. This task
was an adaptation of the reasoning task used in experiment one to present information to participants in a
visual modality. Statements were present on screen for participants to observe for as long as they wished. In
addition to previous studies in this paper, the dot matrix memory task (dual task) was completed. Both of these
tasks were presented and completed using E-Prime stimulus software. This design explores whether ‘dual
tasking’ as opposed to a change in modality, and therefore greater demands on processing, enhances the
effects of biases in individuals who score high for delusional beliefs. This is supported by the evidence of bias’
occurring in individuals with Schizophrenia, schizo-type disorders, as well as a small amount of evidence for
differentiation in psychosis prone individuals (Ferstl, Hanewinkel, & Krag, 1994; Reed et al., 2008).
Results
Descriptive Statistics
The reasoning task results were analysed using SPSS statistics analysis software 17.0, and are presented
below. Descriptive statistics for the ‘data gathering’ scores can be viewed in Table 3.
Table 3
Data Gathering’ Descriptive Statistics
Crime Type
Low PDI (n = 25) High PDI (n = 25)
df F pM SD M SD
Violent (hard) 1,48 11.84 <.001
4.72 4.03 3.04 3.05
Violent (easy) 1,48 18.31 <.001
5.2 3.99 2.68 2.69
Non Violent (hard) 1,48 2.52 .12
4.32 3.53 2.88 2.83
Non Violent (easy) 1,48 2.99 .09
5.68 3.65 3.48 3.16
Inferential Statistics: ‘Data Gathering’
The data gathering results were analysed using a 3 way mixed Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to assess the
impact of one between subject independent variables (PDI: high and low) and two within subject independent
variables (Scenario type: violent and non-violent; Memory load: high and low) on participants ‘data gathering’
scores.
Box’s test of equality of covariance matrices was significant (p = .04) and therefore the results below are
reported using the Greenhouse-Geisser correction.
There was no significant interaction between memory and PDI, F(1, 48) = 2.69, p = .11, η2 = 0.05, PDI and
Scenario type, F(1, 48) = 0.12, p = .73, η2 = 0.00, memory and scenario, F(1,48) = 1.18, p = .28, η2 = 0.02, and
memory, scenario and PDI, F(1, 48) = 0.00, p = .96, η2 = 0.00).
There was a significant difference in mean data gathering between high and low scorers, F(1, 48) = 6.79,
p = .01. There was also a significant main effect of memory (easy / hard: p = .03) but there was no significant
main effect of scenario type (p = .65).
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Discussion
The data presented no significant interactions, in any combination, between PDI, memory load and crime type.
This could be interpreted, explained and accounted for in a number of ways. It is possible that the experiment
design is not sensitive enough to capture any relationships between PDI, dual systems of processing and crime
scenario type, despite adopting tools and methods that had been used previously in a number of studies which
had generated significant results (De Neys, 2006; Evans, 2008; Galbraith et al., 2010).
The results suggest that the biases that occurred in experiment one and two were not a result of overloaded
resources and increased demands placed on memory but rather the impact of modality (visually or auditory
processed information). Nonetheless, it is impossible to be conclusive without testing the dual process
paradigm within the auditory modality.
It is also possible that dual process theory does not adequately account for aspects of crime based real world
reasoning and hence there is no relationship or interaction between the two separate systems when reasoning
about crime based scenarios. It is also possible that the two systems of processing do not impact upon one
another when individuals are engaged with crime based reasoning. This would suggest that decisions can be
made in the presence of other cognitive tasks, therefore, what is important is the modality of presented
information in relation to delusional ideation. The implications of this study would suggest that in an applied
setting, such as a courtroom, it is the mode and delivery of information that is important for decision making
rather than the number of processes occurring in the setting.
Experiment Four
Experiment four was designed as an adaptation of study three but delivered and presented in an auditory
format. It was hypothesised that the auditory format would enhance and elevate the effects of a reasoning bias.
Method
Participants
Sixty-One participants took part in the auditory Dual Processing study. The participants were recruited from a
west midlands University. The sample consisted of undergraduate students from a range of faculties and
degree courses across the University. Participants were aged between 18 and 38 (M = 22.8, SD = 5.41), 21
were males and 40 females.
Design
A 2x2x2 experimental design was adopted for this study. Independent variables PDI (high and low), crime type
(Violent and non-violent) and memory task (High and Low). The dependent variable was data gathering (the
amount of information participants required to make a decision).
Materials and Procedure
The study comprised three main component measures. As with the previous studies in this paper, the 21-item
Peters Delusions Inventory (Peters et al., 1999) was used to measure delusional belief ideation (see study one
for more information). The Dual Processing Auditory Computerised Decision Task (DPACDT) was developed
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especially for this study. The task was based on the visual crime based reasoning task in experiment three,
however, the renovated design presented the scenarios and statements to participants in an auditory modality
accompanied by a visual dot matrix memory task. The tasks were presented and results were recorded using
E-Prime stimulus software. This design explored whether reasoning biases are further enhanced by ‘dual
tasking’ or whether the modality of presented information impacts upon individuals decisions (Ferstl,
Hanewinkel, & Krag, 1994; Reed et al., 2008).
Participants were presented with either a simple or difficult dot matrix memory test which they were required to
remember whilst reading a crime based scenario accompanied by additional statements. Participants were
required to indicate at which point they were happy to make a decision about whether the character in the story
had done the right thing. Participant’s responses were recorded on a ten-part scale. Once participants had
completed the crime scenario, they were then requested to recall the dot matrix memory task. This process was
repeated to account for violent and non violent as well as simple and difficult conditions.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
The reasoning task results were analysed using SPSS statistics analysis software 17.0, and are presented
below. Descriptive statistics for the ‘data gathering’ scores can be viewed in Table 4.
Table 4
Data Gathering Descriptive Statistics
Crime Type
Low PDI (n = 20) High PDI (n = 20)
df F pM SD M SD
Violent (hard) 1,46 10.37 <.001
6.50 3.08 2.08 1.99
Violent (easy) 1,46 11.39 <.001
6.88 3.17 2.33 1.69
Non Violent (hard) 1,46 0.52 .48
6.21 2.96 2.55 2.46
Non Violent (easy) 1,46 14.87 <.001
6.54 3.27 2.41 1.77
Inferential Statistics: ‘Data Gathering’
The data gathering results were analysed using a 2x2x2 mixed Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to assess the
impact of one between subject independent variables (PDI: high and low) and two within subject independent
variables (Scenario type: violent and non-violent; Memory load: high and low) on participants ‘data gathering’
scores.
Box’s test of equality of covariance matrices was significant (p = .00) and therefore the results below are
reported using the Greenhouse-Geisser correction.
There was no significant interaction between memory and PDI, F(1, 46) = 0.48, p = .49, η2 = 0.01, PDI and
Scenario type, F(1, 46) = 0.95, p = .33, η2 = 0.02, memory and scenario, F(1, 46) = 0.57 p = .81 η2 = 0.00, and
memory, scenario and PDI, F(1, 46) = 0.04, p = .85, η2 = 0.00.
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There was a significant difference in mean data gathering when comparing high and low PDI scorers, F(1, 46) =
70.7, p < .001.
Discussion
As with experiment three, the analysis of the data gathering results found no significant relationships between
PDI, dual processing and crime type, suggesting that these factors do not impact upon one another. However,
there were significant differences highlighted between high and low PDI scorers with regards to their data
gathering scores consistent with previous findings. High PDI scorers required fewer pieces of information
before coming to a conclusion in comparison to low scorers who require more pieces of information before
making a decision. However, the memory tasks did not interfere with this finding and caused no further elevated
signs of reasoning biases. This suggests that the dual processing (Evans, 2008) account does not provide an
explanation for why biases are elevated when presented in a visual modality.
Discussion and Conclusion
The results gathered from the series of experiments, overall, are consistent with previous studies of delusional
ideation and a ‘jump to conclusions’ bias (Freeman, Pugh, Vorontsova, Antley, & Slater, 2010; Galbraith,
Morgan, Jones, Ormerod, Galbraith, & Manktelow, 2014; van Os, Linscott, Myin-Germeys, Delespaul, &
Krabbendam, 2009) and therefore a ‘jump to conclusions’ bias can be applicable to crime based reasoning as
well as everyday scenarios. Although it appears that memory load does not affect the relationship between
delusional ideation and a ‘jump to conclusions’ bias, other variables do appear to enhance the affect.
Experiment one and two produced particularly interesting findings with regard to both reasoning biases and
influential factors surrounding the intensity of those biases. It was concluded from experiment two that
delusional ideation and crime based reasoning related to either modality, visual or auditory presented
information (Delhommeau, Dubal, Collet, & Jouvent, 2003), or the increase load on memory resources which
naturally occur when remembering information that has been received through the auditory senses. However,
when examining the shortfalls of experiment one, it was clear that the methodological design adopted for this
study made it impossible to identify whether the causal factor was modality or indeed competition for working
memory resources. Therefore, experiment three and four provided a solution to address this problem by
adopting a dual task design (Evans, 2008). This allowed for an investigation of whether an increase in memory
load enhances the crime based reasoning biases identified by experiment one and two. The outcome of these
additional studies suggest that it is not increased load on memory and resources that enhances the biases and
therefore it can be deduced that there are key differences when reasoning about crime using verbally
presented information compared to visually presented information. The results reported in experiment two
demonstrated that individuals with Schizotypal tendencies required fewer ‘pieces’ of information before making
a decision, compared to individuals who scored low for Schizotypal tendencies. There was a significant
difference in both non-violent and violent crime scenarios with regard to individuals; ‘data gathering’ scores.
However, the violent crime scenario created a bigger gap between the mean ‘data gathering’ scores generated
by the high and low scoring groups. Therefore, it could be suggested that the violent crime scenario enhances
the ‘jump to conclusions’ bias that frequently occurs in individuals at risk of delusions (Huq, Garety, & Hemsley,
1988). Furthermore, the results suggested that the biases in reasoning that accompany delusional ideation,
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have presented themselves on traditional non-specific reasoning tasks, also present themselves on crime
based reasoning tasks given the right conditions.
The findings from the series of experiments could have implications, or at least pose questions, in applied
areas such as the court room. It seems that levels of delusional ideation relate to the amount of information
individuals require to make a decision about crime based scenario which is a process of decision making that
occurs in court cases, particularly in cases and systems that include a jury. Consequently, future studies might
explore this relationship in a mock court room setting, or individuals making decisions in the presence of other
individuals and other individuals responses.
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Appendix 1
Violent Scenario
Jared was walking home from work late one night when he heard a scream from the road ahead. He ran down the road to
find a lady lying on the floor calling for help. She told Jared that she had been attacked by a gang. As there were lots of
people surrounding the lady by this point, Jared ran further down the road in the direction that the lady had said the gang
had gone. Jared caught up with a group of lads who were running down the road. He shouted at them and managed to
capture one of them by the hood. Losing his temper he threw the guy to the floor and punched him.
Did Jared do the right thing?
The young man that Jared attacked ended up in hospital
The lad that Jared had assaulted had nothing to do with the attack on the lady
The lady had been causing trouble in the neighbourhood
One of the gang members was an ex-boyfriend of the lady
The police were monitoring the gang and all confrontations should have been reported to the police
Jared had previously confronted neighbours about noise levels and they had threatened to hurt his fiancé
The attack towards the lady had left her with a broken arm, sprained wrist and black eye
The lady Jared had found in the street was his fiancé
That was the final statement, did Jared do the right thing?
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